European Journal of Science and Theology, August 2018, Vol.14, No.4, 95-107

FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH
THE CASE OF PRESENT-DAY SLOVAKIA

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(Received 17 August 2017, revised 7 March 2018)

Abstract

This article wishes to analyse current trends in the religious landscape of Slovakia, using the tools of conceptualization and diagnostics. It then has the ambition to attempt to delineate a competent response from the side of public theology. The primary question is 'To what extent has the religiosity's importance on subsystems of the society declined or increased?' with relation to the phenomena of (1) the second demographic transition, (2) and post-communist transformation, both of which have brought profound changes in value orientations and moral attitudes of today's society. Instead of individual's identity being formed in the process of primary and secondary socialization, it is often deformed, having been influenced by desocialization of family, school or peer environment. The mesospace of a community life has also suffered consequences caused by the loss of community (a closely-knit interpersonal fellowship) and the causally connected modernization processes of the industrial and post-industrial society.

Keywords: religious faith, religiosity, Slovakia, public theology, secularization

1. Why we must care about religion in society

When searching for answers to questions of religiosity and the future of religion, it is necessary to focus our attention on the fact that religion is not an independent, self-enclosed social entity. Issues like: 'What has been happening with religiosity?' and 'To what extent has the religiosity's importance on subsystems of the society declined or increased?' are the ever–present questions of sociology of religion, relevant also for the discipline called 'public theology' [1-3]. Various transformations in the present-day modern society constitute the appropriate context in which to study particular parameters of religiosity. These transformations affect all areas of social life: culture and politics, values and lifestyle, consumption models, stratification, education and mobility. There is not a single area exempt from the transformation processes linked with modernization, globalization, and transition from the communist system to the

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post-communist one [4]. Europe of today has been experiencing considerable turbulence affecting all aspects of social life. While being aware of the present political situation dominated by political elites' exercising at times rather vulgar and despotic form of democracy, we are predominantly interested in processes within the cultural and religious subsystems of the society. We consider these subsystems to be pillars of stability and integrity of the whole society, therefore every attack to weaken the cultural and religious capital leads directly to the disintegration of the whole system.

Contemporary European society shows several paradoxes regarding religiosity. An increasing demand for spiritual fulfilment and metaphysical expression of life is contrasted and yet also complemented by a lifestyle of uncontrollable consumerism, materialism and hedonism [5]. Values and norms set by religious institutions are often deemed obsolete, backward and unsatisfactory vis-à-vis the demands of today's world [*Detradicionalizace a individualizace náboženství 2006 (DIN 2006)*, Sociologický ústav Akademie Věd ČR, http://www.soc.cas.cz/projects/cz/16/2524/Detradicionalizace-a-individualizace-nabozenstvi-v-Ceske-republice-a-jejich-sociopoliticke-a-socio ekonomicke-dusledky.html]. Globalization brings the prevailing trend of individualism (or ad hoc 'tribalism') to those sectors of human activities in which, just a few decades ago, it would not have stood a chance of surviving. Borders, from geographical to ideational, have been gradually disrupted in their basic structure, giving way to global market, both economic and cultural. On a global scale, we witness a reciprocal blending of diverse cultures initiating heterogeneity of cultures and societies. In turn, this process leads to increased protection of diversity and identity of ones' own individual cultures, even to the point of a resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia. There is a new phenomenon, in the domain of symbols and ideas as well as in religiosity, called 'super-marketization' of ideas and symbols [6]. As a result of this market behavior, religiosity has become a market commodity adapting to a current offer based on individual preferences and needs. This trend has reached Slovakia, too. Gradually, one can piece together one's own individual cultural and religious mosaic – a vision of religious faith that has departed far away not only from the classic, Trinitarian faith of Christianity but also from its cultural and political implementations and manifestations in the concrete social milieu of Slovakia. This article wishes to analyse current trends in the religious landscape of Slovakia, using the tools of conceptualization and diagnostics. It then has the ambition to attempt to delineate a competent response from the side of public theology.

2. Changes in Sociology of religion

Religiosity is a multidimensional phenomenon assuming various forms because one can be religious in many different ways. Since the half of the 20th century, there has been a significant shift in efforts to determine religiosity and its operationalization in sociological research, using diverse indicators to

determine the nature and effects of religious phenomena.

In 1948, the American sociologist, Joseph Fichter, created a conceptual framework to determine religiosity identifying these dimensions: 1) Christian creed (all members must believe in certain truths); 2) Christian code of behaviour (established norms and patterns of behaviour, reflecting for example the teaching of the Ten Commandments); 3) Christian Cult (includes sacramental and liturgical system of Church and people's piousness); 4) Christian community (expresses the sociological dimension of the local and global Church) [7]. This led Fichter to define four types of religiosity: core, formal, peripheral and inactive [8]. Fichter claims that the religious experience is sociologically relevant since each of the dimensions influences and is influenced by the other three. In addition, when investigating religiosity, the researchers must be aware of moral norms that the particular church requires their members to abide by. A researcher must also take into account any specific requirements of the given Church in question, pertaining to the dimension of cult [9].

The Polish sociologist, Wladyslaw Piwowarski, elaborated a system of 7 parameters: 1) Overall relationship towards faith (self-declaration of the respondent related to the intensity of his religious attitude and other three indicators); 2) Religious knowledge (knowledge of the Holy Trinity, resurrection, significance of sacraments in the Christian's life, the names of four evangelists and other eight indicators); 3) Religious ideology (believing in afterlife, God's Providence, the deity of Christ and other seven indicators); 4) Religious experience (experience of God's closeness, the feeling of security, assistance in everyday life and other four indicators); 5) Religious practice (holy mass attendance, being aware of duty to attend holy mass, confession, fasting, significance of sacrament of holy matrimony and other thirteen indicators); 6) Religious community (the sense of belonging to the church and parish, being aware of the need to contact a priest, and some other nine indicators); 7) Ethical dimension of religiosity (inseparability of marriage, religious education, keep the feast days holy and other seven indicators) [10].

Even with all the mentioned researched dimensions and corresponding indicators, however, religiosity cannot be examined in its full extent within the social spheres of society due to its transcend nature. The American sociologist, Rodney Stark, issues the following warning on that account: "what distinguishes the scientific from the old atheistic approach to religion is fundamentally a matter of motives. As social scientists, our purpose should neither be to discredit religion nor to advance a religion of Science. Rather, our fundamental quest is to apply social scientific tools to the relationship between human beings and what they experience as divine. Science may examine any aspect of that relationship except its authenticity." [11] Nevertheless, the thorough definition of a concrete research area creates a space for analysis of important parameters of religiosity, such as parameters of practice and knowledge, and also for a comparison and categorization based on these parameters. It is on research results such as these that we wish to develop our own sociological and religious analyses.

3. Socially significant changes in Slovakia after 1990

After 1990, there have been several socially significant changes in Slovakia:
(a) in politics, democracy replaced the totalitarian system of government;
(b) in economics, capitalism replaced socialism;
(c) in culture, freedom of thought replaced Marxism;
(d) in society, socialist demographic model was replaced by a liberal one.

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, we have witnessed radical changes in the demographic behaviour of the Slovak society. These changes are rather significant and can be described as: (1) decline in birth, marriage and abortion rates (predominantly in younger age groups) and (2) increase in divorce rate, contraceptive use (mainly hormonal contraception) and numbers of children born out of wedlock. After 1990, Slovakia went through other demographic changes, such as decline in infant mortality rate and subsequent slight increase in medium life expectancy at birth, change in migration balance from negative to positive, and an increase in the average age of the population. However, all these changes are only of secondary importance to demographic behaviour. This shift in demographic behaviour patterns in our society is a reflection of transition from socialist demographic model to a liberal demographic model. Slovakia has adopted it from its neighbouring, western developed countries, along with their prevailing political, economic and cultural models.

These changes can be observed on the basis of several international as well as national comparative surveys. The five most important international surveys are: (1) International Social Survey Programme ISSP (surveying issues related to religion 1998, 2008, identity 1995, 2003, 2015, etc.) [12]; (2) World Values Survey WVS (1990, 1998, 2017; the last round was conducted in conjunction with the EVS) [WVS Association, *World Values Survey (1990-2017)*, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp]; (3) European Values Study EVS (1991, 1999, 2008, 2017) [*European Value Study (EVS): How do Europeans think about life, family, work, religion, sex, politics, and society?*, 2008, 1991-2017, http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/]; (4) European Social Survey ESS (biannual surveys starting from 2001) [European Research Infrastructure, *European Social Survey*, 2001-2017, http://www.european socialsurvey.org/]; and (5) Aufbruch (social survey focused on religious question conducted by the Pastoral Forum in Vienna; 1997, 2007) [13]. Among national surveys, the following stand out in terms of their applicability to our topic: (1) Only one nationwide survey was conducted regarding religiosity during socialism in Slovakia – the one conducted by Peter Prusak [14]; (2) Miroslav Tížik from the Institute of Sociology, Slovak Academy of Sciences, conducted a new survey in 2014, which partially dealt with the same questions that the original survey had dealt with in 1968 (including religious attitudes of inhabitants) – Democracy and Citizens in Slovakia, DOS 2014 [http://sasd.sav.sk/sk/data_katalog_abs.php?id=sasd_2014003]; (3) the sociologist Ján Bunčák conducted a survey that specifically dealt with religious

questions between the years 1991-1999. Based on his survey, Bunčák describes the changes in value system of Slovaks after the fall of the Communist regime in 1989 [15].

4. Changes in religiosity in Slovakia (and beyond)

The Slovak nation-wide Censuses from 1991, 2001 and 2011, conducted with similar (compatible) methodology of measuring religiosity, show that the number of citizens declaring their religious affiliation ranged from around 75% (73% - 84% - 76%, to be more precise, the proportion of missing responses being 17% - 13% - 11%) (Table 1) [16].

Table 1. Religious affiliation of the citizens in Slovakia based on censuses in 1991, 2001 and 2011.

Church (Denomination)	1991	2001	2011
Roman Catholic Church	3 187 383	3 708 120	3 347 277
Greek Catholic Church	178 733	219 831	206 871
Orthodox Church	34 376	50 363	49 133
Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession	419 987	372 858	316 250
Reformed Christian Church	-	109 735	98 797
Evangelic Methodist Church	-	7 347	10 328
Apostolic Church	-	3 905	5 831
Old Catholic Church	-	1 733	1 687
Brethren Unity of Baptists	-	3 562	3 486
Czechoslovak Hussite Church	625	1 696	1 782
Seventh-day Adventists	-	3 429	2 915
The Brethren Church (Free Evangelical Church)	-	3 217	3 396
Christian Congregations	-	6 519	7 720
Central Union of Jewish Religious Communities	-	2 310	1 999
Religious Society of Jehovah's Witnesses	-	20 630	17 222
New Apostolic Church	-	-	166
Baha'i Community	-	-	1 065
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints	-	-	972
No religious affiliation	515 551	697 308	725 362
Other	19 845	6 294	23 340
Undetected	917 835	160 598	571 437
Total population	5 274 335	5 379 455	5 397 036

Following the coerced political secularization of the Slovak society under Socialism, a 'cultural' (spontaneous) secularization started to manifest itself more visibly (although still moderately) in Slovakia later than in the West,

perhaps as late as around 2010 [17]. The overall population increased by quite a small number – only 17 851 people, as compared to the period between 1991 and 2001 where the increase in population amounted to 520 737. It was confirmed again that the most dominant Church was the Roman Catholic Church, according to the Census 2011 (65.8% of the population), though there is a decrease in membership by 7.2% as compared to 2001 [16, 18]. This decrease applies to both – the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic rite (Byzantine rite). The period from 2001 through to 2011 begins to show the negatives of a religious stagnation throughout the Slovak nation. The dominant Christian Church in 2011 continues to be the Roman Catholic Church, with minor changes when compared to 2001. This Church represents 62.0% of citizens in the Slovak Republic. The Roman Catholic Church has declined by 6.9% between 2001 and 2011, based on the self-perception of the inhabitants. In 2011, Christians accounted for 75.2% of all citizens of the Slovak Republic. If we compare it with the year 2001, it is a decrease by 8.2%. 725 362 residents, or 13.4 percent, said that they are without religion. Religion was entirely foreign to 571 437, or 10.6 % of inhabitants in the Slovak Republic.

We may thus establish that Slovakia has remained predominantly a Christian country, as roughly three quarters of its inhabitants continue to identify themselves as believers who are in some way affiliated with a Christian church/denomination. There are Christians of different practices, as well as those who do not practice their faith at all. Christian religion is most evidently manifested in the believers' lives in their celebration of holidays, not in their attendance of church services. Yet most inhabitants who identified themselves with a Christian denomination are still, at least marginally, practicing their faith also liturgically. In Slovakia, there are church nursery schools, primary schools, secondary schools and universities (the Catholic University in Ruzomberok). The Slovak Constitution guarantees to all citizens freedom of religious practice and expression. This pertains to all registered religious groups and organizations. In schools, students (or their parents, if the pupil is in a lower level of education) may choose between religious education (Catholic, Lutheran, or Reformed, or other, providing there are enough children), or the alternative subject of ethics for children of other faiths or for those who are non-religious. Parents are free to decide whether to enrol their children in religion or ethics.

Researchers working with the data obtained in the European Values Study (1990, 1999 and 2008) offer a similar picture of religiosity development in Slovakia [17]. Data obtained from a representative research provide more tools to a more detailed analysis of what one's declared adherence to a religious group means. Only such data can reveal the nature of the attributes pertaining to religious life. The current researches show that the religiosity in Slovakia is not on the decline, as anticipated in the context of secularism, just the contrary. The Slovak sociologists under the leadership of T. Podolínska confirm our observation, noting that Slovakia is the only country among the ones examined in EVS study in which there has been reinforcement of religiosity (comparing 1991 and 2008) [17; cf. 19]. To be more precise, there was a significant

strengthening of religiosity in the first decade after the end of totalitarianism but in the second decade (2001-2011) there was a slight weakening. In Poland and Austria, religiosity weakened considerably, whereas in Hungary and the Czech Republic the religiosity was only slightly weakened. These trends were mostly apparent on different levels of religiosity. The change after the fall of communism brought revalorization of traditional – ecclesial modes of religiosity but also new forms of piety. The researches of 1991, 1999 and 2008 [http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/; 19] confirm the existence of three groups of countries. Poland is the country with significantly highest religiosity, the Czech Republic, on the other hand, is least religious. Slovakia belongs to the group in the middle together with Austria and Hungary. In terms of religiosity, Slovakia is closer to Poland than to the Czech Republic. The thesis that secularization grows proportionally with the level of modernization has not been confirmed for the region in question [17, p. 181ff].

It should be also said that what is changing is the content of faith because it has been tied to the institutionalized Church much less in the recent decade than before. The concept of 'religious tourism' is used to designate the process of privatization of religious contents based on individual preferences. The above-mentioned premises are reflected in the research *Aufbruch* [13] conducted in the years 1997–2007 by Pastoral Forum in Vienna. (Among Slovak scholars who have worked with the results of the Aufbruch Survey, J. Žuffa made a solid attempt to analytically apply it on the situation of the Catholic Church in Slovakia [20]). Changing trends in religious orientation and attitudes were explained on the example of 14 post-communist countries in Central and East Europe. The research was focused on three main aspects of religiosity: (1) personal religiosity – self-declaration of the respondent, to what extent does he/she consider himself/herself a religious person, God's place in his/her life, to what extend does faith bring him/her relief and strength, how often does he/she pray or yearn for a quiet time contemplating; (2) the content of personal religiosity – one's belief in the personal Christian God and acceptance of all articles of faith; (3) the relation of personal religiosity to the Church – religious affiliation, mass attendance, trust and confidence in Church representatives, expectations from the Church. The dimension of personal religiosity is defined by the following questions: How religious do people see themselves (the issue of self-perception)? What influences their religiosity? What impacts does religiosity have on a particular person and his/her life in general?

A simple evaluation of the first question shows that 60% of the respondents in Slovakia (as of 2007) regarded themselves profoundly religious or partially religious [13, p. 12]. While Hungary and the Czech Republic show a decrease of personal religiosity in the course of ten years (1997 – 2007), the numerical results from Slovakia and Poland show its increase. Our experience of the past decades shows, however, that the self-perception of one's religious identity is significantly less linked to the full acceptance of the doctrinal and liturgical contents of a particular religious faith. We can talk about the so-called

'religious tourism,' i.e. a person privatizes the contents from different religions according to his/her own liking.

The results of the Matulnik's sociological research (2008) [19] confirm that despite the long-term suppression of the Church during the Communist regime and other unfavourable effects Slovakia had to face, there are rather large numbers of Catholics who practice their religion on regular basis. Based on the data it can be estimated that the number exceeds one third and moves to two fifths of all of those who affiliate themselves with the Church. Given the high proportion of inhabitants adhering to the Church in Slovakia, the practicing Catholics make up a significant part of the whole population of our country. It is encouraging that among the young Catholics under 30 years of age, the practicing believers constitute a substantial portion. With respect to education, the positive finding is that the believers are also among the university educated people and the university educated Catholics have as high level of religiosity as other people. This finding goes against the generally accepted theory that religiosity decreases with education.

The practicing Catholics are, in comparison to others, more closely tied to their parish communities; they meet priest more often (also outside the church), they respect the prohibition of Sunday work and avoid shopping on Sundays, too; they have higher values of religiosity based on the indicators of: (a) religious faith, (b) religious practice and (c) knowledge. They assign higher value to marriage and reject premarital cohabitation, abortion and hormonal contraception and they show the higher values of intended fertility. Practicing Catholics are significantly less influenced by non-Christian religiosity, spiritism, superstition, magic, etc. [9, 19]. However, the research results also show several facts that cannot be assessed positively, at least from the perspective of church officials and engaged believers [19, p. 235]:

(1) A rather large number of Catholics in bigger towns do not know which parish they belong to and they do not feel attachment to their parish community. Some demonstrated lack of knowledge of the church activities.
(2) Only a small proportion of believers affiliated with the Church read the Holy Scripture and other religious literature.
(3) Quite a large number of believers affiliated with Church succumb to effects of non-Christian religiosity and mysticism. More than 14% believe in Spiritism, one fifths would not mind if their child decided for another Christian religion (Buddhism, Jehovah's Witnesses, Scientology or Hare Krishna.
(4) A large proportion of those affiliated with the Church assumes very benevolent attitude towards cohabitation, hormonal contraception, sex before marriage.

On the contrary, the obtained data concerning public life of the Church can be assessed positively. The majority of those affiliated with the Church think it is a good and necessary practice for the Church authorities to address important issues of the society.

5. Conclusions

The nature of the second demographic transition has brought profound changes in value orientations and moral attitudes of today's society. In the microspace of an individual, it has become increasingly difficult to create one's own identity, answer fundamental existential questions or create a meaningful horizontal and vertical world of relationships and coherent support system. Instead of individual's identity being *formed* in the process of primary and secondary socialization, it is often *deformed*, having been influenced by desocialization of family, school or peer environment. The mesospace of a community life has also suffered consequences caused by the loss of community (a closely-knit interpersonal fellowship) and the causally connected modernization processes of the industrial and post-industrial society [21]. (For an interesting analysis of the problem of human existence in our modern, technological world from the same author, see [22].) These social changes affect religious communities in many ways, yet the speed and nature of these changes is also influenced by the structure, piety, ethos within the religious communities. Social changes and religion are two mutually influencing phenomena that need to be taken serious in all their complexities in all types of social environment. (For a recent study on the legacy of the Greek Catholic leading personalities and martyrs in Slovakia and their contribution for the building up of a free Slovak society see [23]. A more general approach to the historical legacy of Greek Catholics in Slovakia can be observed in [24].)

Efforts to replace religion as a universal phenomenon with positive science or to destroy it using overt or covert political means have failed. Postmodern era has discovered the so-called *horror vacui* – fear of empty spaces, nothingness and absurdity that cannot be driven away either by the entertainment industry or the cult of hedonism. Religion remains (despite the predictions of many) one of the elementary forms of institutionalized social action whose main goal is to partake in maintaining the stability of the whole system [25]. Berger puts it somewhat poetically, yet with a good measure of competence when he argues that *religiosity* could be seen as a *symbolic universe*, constituting a basic cognitive and value framework of social reality [5]. They assume that the religious elements in today's society are present in our way of thinking, especially when assigning a more profound meaning to our actions and life in general [26]. Rejected religiosity, on the other hand, continues to be a subject of interest for the ideologists of postmodernism.

However, none of the 'big concepts' resonating today (secularization, privatization, religious pluralism) can be used as an explanatory framework for the Slovak (but also for Polish) empirical data. Based on the analysis of results obtained in representative researches in Slovakia, it can be concluded that the 'traditional' (ecclesial religiosity) has been among the prevailing and quite stable types of religiosity in the past 20 years or so. In the current religious context of Slovakia, we can observe manifestations of religiosity ranging from a more profound religiosity, mystical religiosity supported by spiritual experience of

faith, traditional religiosity, selective religiosity, individualized and privatized religiosity, all to way to secular religiosity that exhibits the trend of a partial decline of religious needs. Contemporary humans give preference to subjective feelings and experiences, they are seekers who like experimenting and this applies to the domain of religion, too. Market pluralism of religious and spiritual offers contributes to this situation. Secularization and de-secularization are two distinct (and competitive) processes of transformation in religiosity and they exist side by side in the modern and postmodern societies [27, 28]. Neither of the two is a myth, they are our societal reality.

Providing the theistic narrative of the origins of our universe is true, religion can shed new light on our understanding of how our world works and what are its fundamental principles. (As Ambrozy reminds us, "[a]nimality places man as a living organism and being with senses into the physical world. The other pole of being is transcendentality which lies in the spirituality of a human being." [29]) This may in turn lead to a more responsible behaviour [30] with relation to others as well as to the natural environment, toward what Kondrla and Repar call 'deep ecology' [31]. (This positive effect, however, is dependent on proper hermeneutics of religious writings – a religious hermeneutics which enables local communities to embrace "the integrity of ontology and ethics as they were captivated by the Gospel narrative" [32].) A competent Christian public theology can provide certain transcending viewpoints going beyond the immanent frame of most of current scientific and socio-political endeavours. If theologians and Church officials fail to develop this potential, Nandrasky's gloomy view of the state of Christianity in Slovakia and beyond might find its full justification. (For an existentialist solution to this challenge see [33, 34]. We should perhaps return to Montaigne's "emphasis on the emancipation (and separation) of politics from religion and positing the will of an individual human person as the determining factor in the development of human societies", as Diatka and Ligus argue in their recent study [35].) In place of a "a system of Theology", religious faith will likely have a more positive impact if it is "understood instead as the most authentic manifestation of the fundamental situation of human beings, who try to find truth about themselves, while striving for salvation" [36]. Religious, theistic anthropologies integrate spiritual realities that "provide an invaluable life orientation, inner motivational force, along with a structure of meaning and purpose. While the spiritual aspect of human existential experience can be expressed through biopsychosocial media, it should be distinguished as a unique, separate anthropological entity that overlaps into transcendent reality. Spiritual etiology, among other things, adds valuable insight into the multifaceted socio-ethical discourse in the contemporary debate between the secularists and those who point out a world-wide resurgence of religious traditions and new forms of spirituality." [37] Ignoring these issues and avoiding such discourse will result in socio-cultural tensions with the potential to destabilize existing states as well as the European Union itself.

Thus we may agree with Wil Arts who points out in his recent critique of the present-day commentators of the European integration that "[w]here European integration was seen and led almost exclusively from the political and economic points of view, the EVS researchers wanted to study the cultural and then especially the value dimension of European integration, being convinced that contrasting values held in the various European countries could hamper the unification of Western Europe" [18, p. 4]. This point is important because similarities in main values and religious outlooks "are conducive to greater trust between people. … Higher levels of trust encourage greater cooperation and economic integration." [38] This brings us back to the task and potential of public theology to remind the state officials as well as the non-religious, secular environment in general of the need to take into account the public nature and obligations of religious communities. Gabriel Paľa points out in this regard that concrete acts of compassion done as part of religiously motivated social work and acts of "selflessness for the sake of the poor" should be seen also as "a chance for spiritual revival" with the potential to bring a more profound change in society [39], and Theodosios Tsivolas reminds us incisively: "The need for preserving religious cultural heritage implicates also the involvement of all associated non-State actors: religious communities, academic institutions, property owners, private funding bodies, charities and other interested partners. The public obligation of the religious communities in particular, correlates also with their autonomous right to act on an equal basis within the public sphere, in order to perpetuate their own cultural treasures according to their internal laws, in view of the principle of State's neutrality. On the other hand, a *positively neutral*, and not an indifferent, State can protect effectively the religious cultural treasures that it encompasses and, hence, be in the position to safeguard the diversity, both in religious and cultural terms, of the heritage located within its territory. … The crucial point is to establish efficient cultural policies that strike a careful balance between the collective freedom of religion and the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual." [40]

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